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Inderjeet Parmar (City, University of London): “Transnational elite knowledge networks: 
Managing American hegemony in turbulent times” 
(word target 13116; baseline was 13809); now 12801) 
Abstract: 
The liberal international order’s (LIO) own theory is as much in crisis as the institutional 
system whose virtues it champions. This is due first to theoretical shortcomings per se; and 
secondly, due to its misunderstanding or neglect of the role of elite knowledge networks and 
of socialisation in the development and perpetuation of American liberal hegemony. The 
article – which adds to recent interest in the dynamics of hegemonic order building  and 
maintenance - argues that a neo-Gramscian-Kautskyian theoretical synthesis better explains 
the character and methods of the LIO. The article considers two cases through which to 
compare liberal internationalist and Gramscian-Kautskyian claims: the 1970s challenge of 
third world states under the banner of a new international economic order (NIEO) and the 
managed ‘opening’ of China; and the Trumpian challenge to the LIO. On that basis, the 
article concludes that the hegemonic LIO and its core states and elite networks are engaged in 
a titanic struggle against forces unleashed by a combination of its own successes, 
inadequacies and exclusions. Gramscian-Kautskyian theory, using the transnationally-
extended ‘elite knowledge network’ concept, also suggests that, despite turbulence, the 
hegemonic LIO has significant powers of adaptation, co-optation, and resistance, and is likely 
to remain resilient, if turbulent and not unchanged, for the foreseeable future. 
 
Introduction 
Is the current crisis of liberal international order (LIO) explicable in liberal-internationalist 
theoretical terms, that is, within the terms of the ‘theory of the system’ itself? I argue that 
while liberal internationalism explains much of how the system was founded and works 
today, it does not fully explain the system’s founding, development, current crisis and future 
prospects. I compare the claims of liberal internationalists’ and Gramscian-Kautskyian 
thought against evidence – the incorporation and socialisation strategies pursued to manage 
the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) by postcolonial states in the 
1970s and the ‘rise’ of China, as well as the mobilisations of foreign policy elite knowledge 
networks to contain, channel or reverse the Trump administration’s America First policies - 




The NIEO-China case allows us to test rival claims of liberal internationalists and 
Gramscian-Kautskyians. China’s integration into the US-led international system from the 
late 1970s demonstrates how significant change is managed within the LIO and the meaning 
of embracing diversity in practice. By the 1970s, the US-led order was facing challenges 
from (West) Germany and Japan, the oil-producing states, demands for a NIEO, and 
recovering from defeat in Vietnam, and the Watergate crisis. Despite liberal internationalist 
claims that the integration of several postcolonial states and China is a success story, the 
question persists as to the levels of instability and repression within emerging powers, driven 
by domestic inequality. NIEO-China tests the claim that the liberal order rewards societies 
broadly speaking whereas a Gramscian-Kautskyian perspective indicates that it mainly 
benefits ruling elites that are accommodated in the US-led LIO. The Trump administration’s 
ire at China’s gains from the US-led LIO in part drives tariff increase policy though with 
broad bipartisan support.1  
Liberal internationalism is a multidimensional complex but also a system of legitimising 
ideological thought embedded in elite knowledge networks, especially in the US academic-
think tank-state complex. Those networks form the liberal internationalist hegemonic 
consensus. Yet, liberal internationalists do not fully appreciate the hierarchical and exclusive 
character, functions and results of elite network behaviour, and nurture a benign view of elite 
socialisation as broadly beneficial to American and other societies.2 Elite networks act 
forcefully to defend US hegemony against perceived domestic challenge, including from the 
Trump administration.3 
 
The LIO is a class-based, elitist, hegemony – with significant racial and colonial assumptions. 
This helps explain the difficulties, even impossibility, of embracing a diverse international 
order. Centuries-long racialized discourses, fortified by slavery, and orientalism, hinder 
acceptance of diversity and equality.4 American elites have increasingly incorporated their 
                                                          
1 Norrloff and Wohlforth article in this volume; also noted in “International Hegemony Meets Domestic 
Politics.” “Trade wars: China fears an emerging united front,” Financial Times 11 September 2018. The united 
front referred to is domestic bipartisanship and EU, Japanese, Canadian, concerns over China’s state capitalist 
model, requiring a hard line including tariff increases. 
2 P. Anderson, American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers (London: Verso, 2015); I. Parmar, Foundations of the 
American Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
3 “Countering Hegemonic Strategies in the Global Political Economy,” in this special issue. 
4 M.H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); F. Furedi, The Silent 
War. Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998). 
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foreign elite counterparts among leading NIEOs-China.5  Hence, liberal internationalist 
successes are qualified by rising inequality, xenophobic unrest and state repression.6  
 
Yet, that world-view and political-economic model was/is challenged – opposition to the 
Vietnam war, racism, sexism, support for workers. The US-led order has entered a period of 
open political crisis, including intra-elite factionalism. President Trump’s orientation is the 
first openly to reject the US-led LIO and attempt to radically remake American identity 
around the white, heterosexual male.7 The Trump administration, therefore, constitutes a key 
test of liberal and Gramscian ideas about how elite knowledge network power works and 
whether it can manage or adapt Trump’s challenge.8  
 
Powerful elite knowledge networks helped build liberal order frequently by fighting 
opponents and channelling their demands, or by incorporating their leading elements. This is 
not socialisation in the sense Ikenberry and Kupchan argue, but elite alliance-building and 
incorporation into the dominant model of order, fostering deep inequalities within emerging 
states. This is explicable in Gramscian-Kautskyian terms. 
 
Liberal Internationalism: theory, ideology, practice 
Liberal internationalism is a well-developed but ambiguous, multifaceted approach to 
understanding, justifying and practicing international politics. As a positive theory, derived 
from liberalism, it is taught in academic international relations to explain how the foreign 
                                                          
5 J. Gerwirtz, Unlikely Partners: Chinese reformers, Western economists, and the Making of global China 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017); G. Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007). N. DeGraaff and B. van Apeldoorn, “US elite power and the rise of 
‘statist’ Chinese elites in global markets,” International Politics 54, 3 May 2017; pp.338-355; they argue 
western influence has created a hybrid Chinese elite that is neither excluded nor fully assimilated in broader 
global elite networks. 
6 P. Bardhan, Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2010); W.A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: OUP, 2010); J. Traub, 
“Is Modi’s India Safe for Muslims?” Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/26/narendra-modi-india-
safe-for-muslims-hindu-nationalism-bjp-rss/; accessed 26 May 2017. 
7 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/jeff-sessions-1924-immigration/512591/; accessed 9 
March 2018; M. Kimmel, Angry White Men (New York: Nation Books, 2017). 
8 “Political Parties” article in this issue for another angle. Yet, I would suggest bipartisan reactions to the death 
of US Senator John McCain indicate broad support for the US-led LIO as threatened by the Trump 
administration: I. Parmar, “Behind the paeans to McCain, A lament over new tactics of hegemony,” The Wire, 5 




policies of leading states work. Normatively, it indicates how the world ought to work. 
Finally, it is a set of policies and institutionalised practices.9 
 
It is unnecessary to disentangle the positive from the normative, the theoretical from the 
practical because this theory derives both from deep principles but is also a set of solutions to 
international problems, especially world wars. Hence, liberal internationalism is frequently 
referred to as Wilsonianism – after Woodrow Wilson’s programme. Missing, however, in 
liberal internationalism are domestic power inequalities – class and race – alongside broad 
attachment to (democratic) elitism, and a hierarchical approach to other powers, especially in 
the global south.10   
 
Nevertheless, liberal internationalists oppose narrow nationalism and trade protectionism, 
within a US-led system. But its core ideas – rule of law, superiority of the ‘western idea’, a 
rules-based institutional order open to all, in principle,  are deeply embedded in US political-
intellectual elite knowledge networks - think tanks, university public policy schools, 
corporate media and the leaderships of both main political parties,11 the core of the ‘wasp’ 
establishment.12 Importantly, however, influential voices in emerging powers support the 
LIO by calling for internal reform.13   
The ‘western idea’ is a core strength of the US-led order: a successful “civilizational 
heritage”, underpinned by America’s New Deal liberalism, extended globally via Bretton 
Woods, Marshall Plan and NATO. In effect, this programme defused domestic class conflict 
and the threat of war through “activist government, political democracy, and international 
                                                          
9 Anderson, American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers, especially pp.159-188. The main textbooks used to teach 
US foreign policy agree that liberal internationalism is multifaceted, theoretical, normatively and positively, as 
well as a series of practically-applicable principles and institutions: M. Cox and D. Stokes, eds. US Foreign Policy 
(Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp.14-15. 
10 R. Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); D. King, Separate 
and Unequal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Kawamura, N. (1977) “Wilsonian Idealism and Japanese 
Claims at the Paris Peace Conference”, Pacific Historical Review 66(4): 503-526; J. Hobson, The Eurocentric 
Conception of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); F. Furedi, The Silent War. 
Imperialism and the changing perception of race (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998. 
11 Parmar, Foundations of the American Century; and Parmar, ‘Racial and imperial thinking in international 
theory and politics,’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18:2, 2016, pp.351-369. 
12 G. Hodgson, ‘The Establishment,’ Foreign Policy 9 (1972-73):pp.3-40. 
13 Deudney, D. and G. John Ikenberry (1994) ‘Wither the West?’ in A. Clesse, R. Cooper and Y. Sakamoto, eds., 
The International System After the Collapse of the East-West Order (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 
p.41; G. Chin and R. Thakur, “Will China change the rules of global order,” The Washington Quarterly 33 (4) 
2010: pp.119-138; K. Mahbubhani, The Great Convergence (New York: Public Affairs, 2013); S. Tharoor, Pax 
Indica (New Delhi: Penguin India, 2012). 
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alliance.” That system claims, in principle, to be capable of assimilating emerging powers 
due to the universalism of its values and tolerance of ethnic differences, although others 
joining this privileged grouping should conform to its rules and US leadership. Critically, 
Western order is exclusive because special rules apply within its zone of peace.14 Yet, even 
within the ‘greater’ West, Japan and S. Korea were not accorded the same treatment as 
Western Europe.15 It was developed as a system of the west and the rest. As EU Co-President 
Tusk noted – the whole point of “euro-atlanticism” was to “prevent post-west world order”.16   
Assimilating minorities, however, is not embracing diversity but maintaining conformity to 
the cultures of the powerful.17 Going forward, as new global powers emerge, Mead advises 
America to embrace and contain them, retaining military superiority should ‘rising’ powers 
become strategic “opponents”.18  
Yet, the New Deal order effectively represented a political compromise for class peace and 
greater productivity that mainly benefitted major corporations while incorporating and 
domesticating organised labour. The postwar settlement excluded racial minorities, unskilled 
and unorganised labour, and women – and relied on war (korea, Vietnam) and a heavily 
militarised economy.19 Liberal internationalists’ accounts elide the class, gendered and racial 
bases of the order. Ikenberry paints an appealing picture of a liberal order that delivered 
material benefits and security to most yet recognises how inequality generated by 
globalisation threatens the system itself.20 
The framework that best fits the dynamics of liberal order-building and maintenance, 
however, must incorporate understanding of the ‘soft’ processes of socialisation or 
incorporation. Violence is a powerful tool but connected with processes of elite socialisation 
                                                          
14 G.J. Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, p.16, fn 17. 
15 Hemmer, C. and P.J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia?” International Organization, 56, 3 
(summer) 2002, pp.575-607. 
16 Tusk’s tweet on 17 May 2017, at https://twitter.com/eucopresident/statuses/867489575937216512; 
accessed 21 August 2017. This echoes the cultural Anglo-Saxonism of Walter Russell Mead that buttresses 
Ikenberry’s institutional analysis; see Mead, God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern 
World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007). 
17 G.W. Domhoff and R. Zweigenhaft, Diversity in the Power Elite (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). 
18Mead, God and Gold, p.360.  
19 R.J. Barnett, Roots of War (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972). 
20 G.J. Ikenberry, Liberal Order, p.184. Parmar, ‘Racial and imperial thinking’; E.B. van Apeldoorn and N. 
DeGraaff, American Grand Strategy and Corporate Elite Networks (London: Routledge, 2015). 
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and alliance-building. Ikenberry’s analysis of international order is so significant precisely 
because elite socialisation is considered central.21 
A critical view of hegemonic socialisation views it as incorporation/domestication into elite 
agendas, not a reflection of a democratic and benign foreign policy.22 In the Gramscian-
Kautskyian perspective, capitalist great powers are unequal at home and imperialistic abroad, 
ultimately pursuing the interests of their ruling elites.23 
Network power 
A key flaw in liberal internationalist theory centres on a failure to appreciate the (elitist and 
imperial) power of elite knowledge networks, which liberals too frequently see as benign 
‘soft power’. My Gramscian-Kautskyian approach views elite knowledge networks as 
fundamental to national and transnational elite power strategies. Hence, Gramscian 
hegemony has at its core a power technology that has proved spectacularly successful in 
building hegemony and managing/preventing radical change.  
 
Elite knowledge network refers to a system of flows (of people, money, ideas) between 
spaces housing critical masses of thinkers/activists; the spaces reflect a division of labour in 
the complex process of producing and applying knowledge; spaces and flows are funded by 
catalytic groupings exploiting opportunities for knowledge-mobilization. Knowledge 
networks provide the conditions for ‘pure’ research with ‘real-world’ applications.  The elite 
knowledge network is American elites’ essential power technology, without which the 
production of ‘useful’ knowledge via trained experts to construct ideology, institutions, and 
policy, would be more difficult.24 When ideas embed in networks that socialise young 
scholars, practitioners and leaders, they become hard-wired thought patterns defining 
normality – ‘thinkable thought’, ‘askable questions’ - integrating knowledge and power, even 
if their inter-relations are not always smooth.25  
 
                                                          
21 Ikenberry, Liberal Order, chapter 2. 
22 R.F. Arnove, Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism (Boston: GK Hall, 1980). 
23 E. Augelli and C. Murphy, America’s Quest for Supremacy and the Third World (London: Pinter, 1988); 
Parmar, Foundations. 
24 Parmar, Foundations. 
25 Lewis  A. Coser, Men of Ideas. See also JS Brown (1999) “Sustaining the Ecology of Knowledge,” Leader to 
Leader 12 at http://www.johnseeleybrown.com/Sustaining_the_ Ecology_of_Knowledge.pdf; cited in Parmar, 
“The ‘knowledge politics’ of democratic peace theory,” International Politics 50, 2 2013; pp.231-256.  
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American elite knowledge networks center on the strategic and heavily-interconnected 
corporate-philanthropic foundation. ‘Liberal’ foundations like Ford and Rockefeller, and 
‘conservative’ variants, fund knowledge networks.26 Unburdened by electors or shareholders, 
they are governed by trustees drawn from corporations, government, corporate-media, and 
elite universities. Their elitist mindsets, ethno-racial and class identities differentiate them 
from the majority of Americans. We can track the rise of American global hegemony by 
exploring the increasing significance of foundations and the institutional architecture that 
owes its origins to concentrated corporate wealth. At home, this comprised a dense network 
of think tanks, university foreign affairs organisations, area studies and social-scientific 
programmes, interlinked with practitioners in politics, media and government. These elite 
knowledge networks built long-term relationships creating pathways for international 
circulation of ideas, people and money, usually strongly-connected with American 
organisations, such as the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations 
(CFR). Their greatest achievement is the elaboration of a liberal-internationalist elite 
consensus spanning both main political parties, media, and attentive publics, that rejected 
‘isolationism’. They helped establish, with full cooperation of the American state, the post-
1945 liberal international order – Bretton Woods, United Nations, Marshall Plan, and NATO.  
 
The official institutions of the liberal international order were also the intertwined spines of 
the private and state-private institutional architecture established during the Cold War to 
perform the major functions of US hegemonic knowledge networks. These networks grew 
deep roots in core western states and civil societies, symbiotic with NATO, European unity, 
and the US-UK special relationship, providing an international umbrella and developing 
politically-powerful domestic constituencies invested in the LIO.27 
 
Nevertheless, ‘hegemony studies’ neglects American ideational-infrastructural power, 
operationalised and embedded in influential power-knowledge networks, with linkages 
unifying private/public domains, international/domestic spheres, legitimising domestic 
vertical power inequality and horizontal inequalities between societies. Those networks are 
the power technology specifically of the foreign policy establishment.28 Such neglect 
                                                          
26 J. Mayer, Dark Money (New York: Doubleday, 2016).  
27 Parmar, Foundations, especially chapter 4. More recently, one of the core parts of the elite network, the 
GMFUS, has established an initiative to counter Russian interference in western politics and elections: 
http://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/; accessed 9 March 2018. 
28 Hodgson, “The Establishment.”  
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diminishes our understanding of the forces that perpetuate American hegemony and enable 
hegemonic elites to block/manage discontent. This article’s neo-Gramscian argument is that, 
despite crises and challenges, including the disruptive effects of Donald Trump’s presidential 
campaign and subsequent Twitter-disseminated rhetoric, those networks continue to 
successfully manage, channel or block threats to American hegemony, and are likely to 
remain significant during the Trump presidency, constraining attempts to radically alter the 
LIO.  
 
American hegemony is imperial in character, rooted in domestic power elites and, therefore, 
contested at home and abroad – more or less openly depending on the balance of forces. 
Hegemony sets requirements on the hegemon – delivery of certain freedoms, rights, security, 
and opportunities – the American ‘dream’, and a stable world order in which prosperity 
increases and aspirations appear achievable.  
 
“Hegemony” is a set of processes by which a combination of state and private agencies, an 
establishment – through a mix of persuasion and coercion – is able to attain “buy in” from 
others for its own objectives. To establish hegemony, the hegemonic power/elite normally 
culturally, intellectually, financially, or militarily penetrates the ‘target’ society/state, thereby 
providing significant impetus in socialising elements in the target group. The bargain struck 
between hegemonic forces and target (elite) groups, is characterised by inequality of power 
and material rewards, a broad Gramscian concept of hegemony.29 Hegemony is underpinned 
by an idea transformed into material life and sustained by its promise of enhanced life 
chances. It is when the hegemonic power is perceived to fail to provide this – or is 
responsible for the opposite – that the intellectual underpinnings of hegemonic ideas are 
challenged. 
 
My approach connects Gramscian thinking with socialist theoretician of “ultraimperialism” – 
Karl Kautsky. According to Kautsky, in contrast to Lenin’s claim of the inevitability of inter-
imperial wars, ultra-imperialism – the tendency of national ruling classes to form 
international class-based alliances to jointly exploit the world’s resources30 - leads to 
competitive cooperation rather than outright military conflict. Kautsky notes that inter-
                                                          
29 Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, Selections for the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1971). 
30V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970),p.112.  
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capitalist corporate/state cooperation takes numerous forms – such as cartels or a “league of 
states.”31 Extant neo-Gramscian analyses – Cox, Gill, but also other Marxists such as Kees 
van der Pijl32 – explore transnational alliances but focus on cold war era US-Western 
European alliances in a junior partnership with the US. I consider non-Western entities – 
NIEO-China – the political-cultural incorporation of which clearly differs. Conversely, all 
incorporation processes come up against national interests and cultural differences.33 
Incorporating any power, great or small, is extremely difficult, conditioned by the actual and 
potential power and domestic values and regime type of the ‘junior’ partner. This would 
suggest greater conflict potential between the US and China, or at least more turbulence.  
Although Kautsky failed to predict the outbreak of the First World War,34 numerous 
relationships uphold his approach, such as the European Union, which has effectively 
prevented war through enduring cooperation. Stokes argues that American power, via the 
LIO, exemplifies ultraimperialism given its system-maintenance role serving a range of states 
– much to President Trump’s pluto-populist chagrin.35 Kautsky’s ultraimperialism was hardly 
free of rivalries and wars, however, given hierarchies endemic in capitalist international 
relations.36 Yet, even critics argue that Kautsky’s idea is more applicable to the post-1945 
LIO, underpinned by US hegemony. Since 1989, ultraimperialism spans virtually the world.37 
Kautsky argues that the pattern of international alliances is subject to change due to uneven 
development, signaling systemic tensions alongside shared interests, straining institutions 
amid muscle-flexing among states – extant or potential hegemon - that feel unduly 
constrained by the international system. Current tensions between the Trump administration, 
China, Germany, the EU, NATO, therefore may represent either LIO breakdown or its 
recalibration.  
                                                          
31 S.K. Holloway, “Relations among core capitalist states: The Kautsky-Lenin Debate Reconsidered,” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 16 (2) June 1983; pp.321-333. The quote is from p.324. 
32 K. van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso, 2014). 
33 D. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled (London: Routledge, 2013; first published 1991); K. Schake, Safe Passage: 
The transition from British to American hegemony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). Hence 
controversies over naval armaments in the 1920s, over the terms of the alliance after 1945, and refusal by PM 
Harold Wilson to militarily support the US in Vietnam. 
34 Kautsky’s support for Germany’s declaration of war drew Lenin’s wrath; see his The Proletarian Revolution 
and the Renegade Kautsky (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974); first published 1918. 
35 M. Wolf, ‘Trump’s pluto-populism laid bare,’ Financial Times, 2 May 2017. 
36 K. Kautsky, “Ultra-imperialism,” Die Neue Zeit, 11.9.1914; 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/09/ultra-imp.htm; accessed 21 August 2017. 
37 M. Thomas, “Empires and War,” http://www.workersliberty.org/files/ultra.pdf; accessed 21 August 2017. 
10 
 
Kautsky is useful in two ways: first, suggesting war, despite tensions, is not inevitable 
between great powers, but for reasons other than those suggested by liberal internationalism’s 
egalitarian/benign ideas about interdependence; and secondly, that great powers, aiming to 
jointly promote their power against others at home or abroad, build elite networks and 
alliances with their elite foreign counterparts where they already hold power or, by extension, 
where such a nascent elite might be fostered. Such is the case in the NIEO-China instances 
discussed below though in neither case is there any suggestion that one state controls another 
– it is that their ruling elites hold shared interests even if that means their enrichment at the 
expense of the broad mass of their own people. This challenges Leninist,38 Realist and liberal 
conceptions of the international order. This is cooperation for shared narrow self-interest but 
resting on unstable social and political foundations.  
Liberal internationalists predict that the integration of rising powers would embrace diversity, 
that the process would be via peaceful persuasive socialisation through benign networks; 
based on the equality of nations in an open international order. As the benefits of 
internationalism would be broadly shared, any dissent would likely be temporary, though 
periodically exacerbated by populism/nationalism, requiring containment. 
 
Gramscian-Kautskyians predict that the hegemonic order is imperial, elitist, racialized and 
hierarchical; that socialisation is really incorporation via elite knowledge networks not 
peaceful persuasion, that it is really transnational elite-alliance building – ultraimperialism – 
designed not to spread the benefits of internationalism to everyone but to relatively small 
minorities; that this would exacerbate inequalities of income, wealth and power. Therefore, 
imperial strategies would be deployed – divide and rule; coercion/hard power to buy elites’ 
support; a degree of socialisation into liberal order mindsets i.e., the ‘transfer’ of US style 
thinking etc… to and with rising powers and their elites. 
 
Defending Order, Channelling Change: Elite Networks and the challenges of the Third 
World and China 
In this two-component case study, US elite networks – in alliance with relevant states and 
international organisations – managed the potential challenge of the Third World for a NIEO, 
and foresaw and exploited the economic-strategic opportunity of a re-emerging China. 
                                                          
38 Lenin, Imperialism. 
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However, while in the case of the NIEO divide and rule tactics prevailed, with China – a 
great power in its own right – a concerted long-term elite network building programme 
emerged. In each instance, however, the aim was to co-opt and integrate rising powers within 
the LIO.  
 
Elite knowledge networks defend established order against counter-hegemonic forces as 
evidenced by the activities of a key organisation conceived by David Rockefeller - The 
Trilateral Commission (TC) which emerged out of his recognition in the early 1970s of US 
relative decline, Western European and Japanese economic recovery and, in part, growing 
Third World challenges to the international system.39 To help the TC, Rockefeller consulted 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Harvard’s Robert Bowie, Henry Owen (Brookings), and McGeorge 
Bundy, Ford Foundation president (and former national security assistant to Kennedy and 
Johnson).40 The TC’s 1974 meeting led to greater attention to the OPEC-induced oil crisis 
and calls for a NIEO. The TC was at the heart of the American establishment’s co-ordinated 
campaign against the NIEO,41 allied with the Heritage Foundation, funded by the Coors 
Foundation.42 This little-known episode illustrates how elite networks mobilize when 
perceiving significant challenges. In this case, while the outcome was an overall ‘defeat’ for 
the proponents of the NIEO, some third world states were further incorporated into the outer 
circles of western power with long term effects on global power distributions.43 Institutional 
changes were also encouraged at the World Bank to undercut the NIEO’s statism, adopting 
free market development strategies via structural adjustment programmes arguing that the 
Bank was the driver of a “real new international economic order.” Henry Kissinger, as 
secretary of state, used the Bank to “blunt southern demands,” and “co-opt developing 
nations” via loans, while Bank president, Robert McNamara, sought coercively through the 
power of loans and debts to “educate” southern officials to oppose NIEO demands. In the 
                                                          
39 Rockefeller, Memoirs (New York: Random House, 2003), p.416. 
40 D. Knudsen, The Trilateral Commission and Global Governance (London: Routledge, 2016). 
41 R.W. Cox, “Ideologies and the NIEO,” International Organization 33, 2 (Spring 1979), p.260. See also, H. Sklar, 
Trilateralism (Boston: South End Press, 1980), especially chapter 4. 
42 J. Bair, “Taking aim at the NIEO,” in P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe, eds., The Road From Mont Pelerin 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp.347-385. The Heritage Foundation led a vigorous 
campaign against the NIEO’s “anti-American and anticapitalist agenda” arguing for cuts in US financial support 
for the UN, especially its NIEO-oriented UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and UNESCO; 
Bair, pp.376-377. 




case of pro-NIEO Nigeria,  Kissinger saw loans as a means of “moderating” Nigeria’s 
voice.44 
 
The West adopted a two-fold strategy in dealing with the ‘rise’ of the third world’s challenge. 
First, co-opt oil-rich states and subdivide the third world into middle class and very poor 
states. That entailed co-opting OPEC through recycling petrodollars into investment in the 
west and the third world, in the latter through loans conditional upon structural economic 
reforms.45 This ensured that the west remained “the vital center” of global management, 
despite concessions and greater third world integration.46  
 
The TC’s report, Towards a Renovated International System47, was predicated on 
Brzezinski’s ideas of a rule-making transnational elite while newly-integrated states would, at 
most, participate in operating the order, thereby permitting “cultivation of the values of the 
trilateral countries”.48 Global hierarchy was maintained through a “series of circles of 
participation involving, in the outer rings, general consultation and discussion, and moving 
inward towards closer cooperation until, in the innermost rings, close collaboration and 
coordination of policies occurs among the inner group…The Trilateral nations… assume 
leadership in the system…. [and] They must be on the watch to assure the system does not 
break down as a result of the various tensions and pressures.”49 While fully acknowledging 
that the Third World rejected the existing order as stacked against them, and its “central 
legitimizing concept of the liberal world economy” and that to poor states “interdependence 
appears as a system of dependence”, such concerns were dismissed: “The public and leaders 
of most countries continue to live in a mental universe which no longer exists – a world of 
separate nations…”50 
 
Brzezinski saw rising third world self-confidence as another “1905 moment” – when an 
Asian power first militarily defeated a European one – a moment of power-shift in the racial 
balance of power. Consequently, he argued, these countries “may be tempted to pursue 
                                                          
44 P. Sharma, “Between North and South: The World Bank and the New International Economic Order,” 
Humanity 6, 1 Spring 2015, p.191; 193. 
45 JM Smith, “The break up: American foreign policy in the 1970s,” World Affairs 177, 6, 2015; p.82. 
46S. Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, p.201; Cox, 272. 
47 RN Cooper, K. Kaiser and M. Kosaka, Towards a Renovated International System (New York: 1977). 
48 Sklar, p.22. 
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policies of confrontation rather than cooperation.”51 The NIEO network mobilized 
dependency theory to demand power redistribution, challenging “the intellectual hegemony 
of liberal economics and its claims to an exclusive ‘rationality’”.52 They demanded reform of 
Bretton Woods institutions, fairer terms of trade, regulated multinational corporations, and 
national sovereignty. 
 
Henry Kissinger proposed a Trilateralist/Club of Rome response - to appease but also to 
“hold the industrialized powers behind us and to split the Third World,” possible only “if we 
start with a lofty tone and a forthcoming stance.”53 The sheer number of Trilateralists in the 
Carter administration, however, could not overcome the rising forces of neoconservatism 
opposing foreign aid. 
 
The NIEO threat was defeated by Trilateral Commission networks, by opposition from more 
ideologically-motivated neoliberal networks, and internal conflicts of interest.54 Trilateralists  
opposed structural change and fragmented the NIEO coalition while advancing some 
changes.55 The 1973 OPEC oil price increases drove a wedge between oil-rich and resource-
poor developing states, exploited by international banks to re-engineer the system and recycle 
excess petro-dollars, promoting development loans conditional on market reforms. This 
approach was most clearly articulated in Foreign Affairs: Tom Farer argued that the third 
world could be more easily accommodated by “creaming off and co-opt [ing].. the natural 
elite… into the establishment… and by slightly increased shares of a very rapidly growing 
pie.”56 And the list of states worth negotiating with resembles today’s BRICS and middle 
level powers: Nigeria, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India and Indonesia. 
Such an accommodation implies concessions “without threatening the fundamental 
arrangements which an accommodationist policy, as much as the hard line, is calculated to 
preserve”.57    
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Sino-US Elite Networks 
China’s re-emergence represents a significant development in the distribution of global 
power. The key issue here is whether US hegemony is being challenged by ‘rising’ China? I 
argue that the US has helped transform and ‘manage’ China, gradually incorporating it into 
the US-led system since 1978, with a special role played by the Ford Foundation, alongside 
numerous international bodies such as the World Bank, through helping build a state-friendly 
‘civil society’, policy-oriented think tanks and in economic reform.58 Ford promoted the 
formation of Sino-American elite knowledge networks closely connected with Chinese 
globalizing elites, through which China’s changing role is managed as are Sino-US relations 
during a time of global power transitions.59 This might be a “new type of great power 
relationship”60 although not one without competition.61 Sino-US elites agree upon the value 
of integrating China into the international order which necessitates managing change within 
China as well as the boundaries of its external power-assertion.62  
 
The Ford Foundation, in building Sino-American elite knowledge networks from the 1950s to 
the 2000s, engaged in a triangular relationship with successive American administrations and 
the Chinese state. US and Chinese grant-recipients formed networks transcending national 
boundaries and, significantly, permitting opportunities for multidirectional exchange of ideas, 
the key form of American hegemony. As Samuel Huntington argues, “American expansion 
has been characterized not by the acquisition of new territories but by their penetration.”63 
The elite networks that helped penetrate China, at the invitation of Chinese political elites,64 
suggest that Sino-US relations may be better characterized by inter-elite collaboration on 
shared agendas rather than by Realist forecasts of inevitable military conflict. Liberal 
approaches that neglect non-state actors’ roles, and claim that the collaboration is of equal 
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Sino-US benefit, neglect inequalities of power in the two states, a development noted by 
Ford.65 
 
Ford helped build a transnational knowledge network operating in the same way as a 
“transnational historic bloc” or international cross-class coalition. It aimed to improve 
technical skills and disseminate new forms of thinking in recipient societies which, in turn, 
might influence policy-making while making it appear domestically-driven.66  
 
Since the 1970s, the US began to integrate the global political economy mainly to offset 
demands for a NIEO.67 By the 1990s, China had applied to join the World Trade 
Organization, necessitating market-led reform, developed a Ford-funded transnational 
knowledge network, and become part of America’s hegemonic strategy. China transformed 
its economic policies, and China and America have become economically interdependent, 
strengthening cooperation rather than furthering fundamental conflict. Part of this process 
involved the introduction of ‘modern economics’ infused with market-led concepts.68 
 
The academic discipline of economics was a principal instrument of American foundation 
intervention in ‘developing’ societies and had major effects in transforming policy 
orientations via new technocratic elites. The ‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile and Indonesia’s 
‘Beautiful Berkeley Boys’ trained in US doctoral programmes driven by modernization 
theory.69 The introduction of modern economics  in China began with sponsorship by China’s 
State Education Commission, sending students for doctoral training at top US universities, 
while Chinese visiting scholars taught and researched at Western universities.70  
 
As newly-minted technocratic elites developed, officially-sanctioned, policy-oriented think 
tanks emerged and, gradually, began to affect economic policy-making. There is no question 
                                                          
65 The Ford Foundation’s Program in China. Briefing Material: Board of Trustees meeting, May 2002, p.2; 
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that Chinese economic reform is primarily driven by the Chinese state, but external forces 
like Ford invested millions of dollars to support Chinese scholars’ training in the West, built 
many kinds of cooperation with Chinese universities and state agencies. Therefore, external 
forces are closely tied to Chinese elites.71  
 
Ford’s aid to the economics discipline in China may be divided into three aspects: American 
research and scholarship on China’s economy from the 1950s;72 developing and expanding 
economics education; and assisting/facilitating China’s economic policy reform programme. 
Ford initially developed U.S.-based contemporary  China economic studies  at Harvard and 
Michigan universities;73 secondly, introduced modern economics to Chinese elite universities 
including Fudan, Jilin, Nankai, Peking, People's, Wuhan, and Xiamen, whose students went 
to economics doctoral programmes at western universities or whose teachers were trained in 
non-Marxian economics by visiting professors in China. Such funding brought the two parts 
of the knowledge network together, forged strong bonds of friendship and thought on 
economic problems. Non-returning Chinese scholars helped strengthen exchange 
programmes with domestic universities and research institutions with Ford support, forming 
another network. Thirdly, the two networks served the Chinese economic reform process and 
gradually expanded to form a transnational knowledge network including think tanks, 
international organizations and state agencies. The result was that China’s economic model 
became more formally linked to the capitalist-world economy, especially due to the influence 
of Nobel laureate economist Lawrence Klein.74 
 
Ford’s investments produced numerous students and scholars who had studied economics 
abroad. In particular, the “Ford class” programme of exchange masters and doctoral research 
– led by economists like Klein, and Princeton’s Gregory Chow, generated over 500 graduates 
in micro and macroeconomics, econometrics, development economics, international finance 
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and so on.75 Ford made a series of grants to help China’s major think tanks gain access to 
relevant experience and expertise through collaborative  research and training  in  applied 
economics. Ford’s Board of Trustees, at its September 1997 meeting, supported their 
internationally trained Chinese scholars to build emerging independent policy research 
institutes like the China Center for Economic Research and the China Center for Agricultural 
Policy, combining the best internationally trained Chinese analysts with domestic colleagues. 
The initiative helped to "build a field" and then focus on specific policy research projects and 
institutions that expanded other on-going Foundation work.76  
 
Ford’s policy complemented official US government attitudes to China, both motivated by a 
broadly shared mindset on ‘national interests’. Thinking long term, and without the necessity 
of congressional funding, Ford hoped that China would re-emerge as a global force, as 
communism was ‘bound’ to falter. Therefore, it was necessary to “know” China and let China 
know about America. Ford president, Paul Hoffman, thought China very important in 
international affairs whether as friend or foe.77 Ford staff member, Finkelstein, emphasized 
that the Foundation’s commitment to the future of Asia and the developing world was  
seriously incomplete without an active interest in China, whose impact on shaping that future 
was already enormous by the 1970s.78  
 
Ford’s activities were an important component of American foreign aid strategy. Ford 
provided funds to the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, which was 
“independent of the government and yet operated with its support” and “responsible for 
arranging the vast majority of Chinese scholars’ visits to the United States prior to 
normalization.”79 Ford staff member, Munford, who had contributed to drafting the early 
China programmes, corresponded with Allen Dulles of the CIA and other government 
officials such as Loy Henderson, Chester Bowles, and Ralph Bunche before submitting the 
draft to the Board of Trustees. That draft was endorsed in 1954, directing Foundation staff to 
to the economic field in China, resulting in the 1970s in the normalization of neoliberalism. 
Ford’s John Bresnan reported in September 1978 that the Foundation’s most significant role 
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in China lay in facilitating Chinese involvement in national and international research 
networks, particularly to provide advanced training in such fields as agriculture, management, 
economics and the arts.80 
 
The 1985 Bashan conference – authorized by China’s governing State Council - was one of 
the most significant turning points in the development of state-market relations in China, 
funded by the World bank whose objectives were identical to those of the Ford Foundation as 
well as of China’s modernizing elites.81 The conference brought together Western and 
Chinese elite networks to discuss practical ways of promoting market relations, using the 
examples of former Soviet bloc nations, such as Hungary, and economic approaches that 
mixed neo-Keynesian and neo-liberal ideas. Its final report’s summary and underpinning 
ideas were widely disseminated across China, stimulating major debates on tailoring foreign 
ideas to Chinese circumstances, enabling them to gain greater currency. The elite networks 
involved at Bashan were heavily interconnected with the organisations established by Ford 
and broadly enabled the implementation of market reforms implied by the work of 
economists such as Janos Kornai, James Tobin, among others.82 They were also used to 
overcome opposition by more conservative elements in China that viewed foreign models as 
inadequate to the task of building socialism. However, Sino-US and other networks’ ideas 
and trajectories aligned with those of the State Council with debate principally on the 
methods by which to adapt foreign advice to specific Chinese macroeconomic management 
and marketization.83  
 
Ford foresaw that economic change would promote social instability beyond the capacity of 
existing state institutions alone to ameliorate. China’s progress and stability was a vital US 
interest.84 In many ways, China in the past 25-30 years has parallels with the rapid changes 
that occurred in the US in the late 19th century – an era of urbanisation, industrialisation, 
mass migrations – with its attendant social and political problems. Corporate foundations, 
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among other institutions, emerged as champions of social scientific knowledge to manage 
change and defeat rival ideologies.85  
 
It is fitting that Chinese political elites should call upon the-then largest US foundation to 
assist them in transforming their country’s economy, and build the civil infrastructure to 
deepen Chinese elite power. This necessitated programmes, according to Ford, in the rule of 
law, political rights, and civil society development.86 Programmes also developed to focus on 
China’s knowledge of international affairs to facilitate its journey into the comity of nations87 
- leading to new university and think tank programmes. 
 
In practice, the above programmes broadened the legitimacy of the Chinese state, creating 
new relationships beyond but under state auspices, with greater space for private initiative.88 
Over the past 40 years, Ford’s invested over $350m in China, while the Rockefeller 
Foundation spent almost $200m mainly on the China Medical Board.89 Such support rebuilt 
some universities, strengthened family planning initiatives, and community development. 
From 1988-2005, the non-governmental organisation building programme received $270m 
including the Tsinghua NGO Centre, paving the way for numerous other foundations 
including Luce, MacArthur, Starr, Asia Foundation etc.. Since 2002 – US foundations have 
invested over $400m on civil society building programmes, 90% being state linked 
organisations – ‘GONGOS’ (government-organised non-governmental organisations) – a Big 
Society, Small Government mission. At the core of the programmes was network 
construction – “synergistic partnerships among government, researchers…” NGOs and 
private citizens.90 Ford built “a critical mass of organisations… that links local need and 
innovation to both the community served and the relevant governmental authorities,” a 
process which has received much scholarly criticism as legitimising state-linked ‘private’ 
initiatives.91 Over 95% of all Ford and other American philanthropic funds were awarded to 
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state-licensed elite organisations, not genuine civil society groups, which fits the top-down 
strategies of US corporate foundations.92 
Sino-US Ford-built and associated knowledge networks remain significant today and include 
new actors such as the Asia Society, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
Heritage Foundation, and the Center for China and Globalization.93 As a result of the 
relationships forged over decades, President Xi Jinping praised globalization and economic 
reform, rejecting ‘isolationism’, at the WEF, January 2017. He also acknowledged the 
hybridity of ideas that transformed China’s economy, and the openness of the One Belt One 
Road infrastructure programme to the rest of the world.94  
 
Despite Trump’s rhetoric on China, 81% of Chinese economists believe Sino-US economic 
relations over the next two decades will get stronger even as cooperation and competition co-
exist, according to a May 2017 survey by China Economist, while 11% think China and the 
US will become strategic partners. Just under 5% of respondents considered conflict between 
China and American as inevitable.95  
Chinese and US think tanks remain in close contact, advocating further economic 
cooperation. The China Finance 40  Forum (CF40) and  the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics (PIIE), for example, jointly organize an annual  conference on 
academic exchange between Chinese and American economists. While Donald  Trump 
emphasized “America First” during the 2016 presidential election campaign, CF40 and PIIE 
issued a declaration of cooperation arguing that Sino-US economic complementarity has led 
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to win-win results in bilateral ties. The PIIE and the CF40 held the their Third Annual China 
Economic Forum in January further emphasizing China’s gradual opening up.96  
Dialogues challenging the public rhetoric of the Trump administration on U.S.-China 
economic relations have been jointly hosted by the New York City-based Asia Society Policy 
Institute and the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE). The dialogue 
included the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the Development Research Center 
of the State Council, and the Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research, coinciding with 
the April 2017 meeting between Presidents Xi and Trump. The think-tanks agreed to help 
their respective governments to bridge gaps, reduce differences, and expand cooperation. 
Chinese delegates conveyed Chinese companies' desire to participate in the U.S. 
infrastructure upgrading plan in various ways while the Americans desired greater 
involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative.97  
Although China's think tanks generally hope that US and China maintain economic 
cooperation, the US think-tanks’ attitudes tend to be more challenging, especially among 
think-tanks close to the Trump administration such as Asia Society and Heritage Foundation, 
reflecting broad bipartisan positions.98 A February, 2017, U.S-China Task Force Report from  
Asia Society  and  the 21st Century China Center at UC, San Diego, recommended the Trump 
administration use a variety of  tools to defend US economic interests in fairer market access 
and reciprocity while warning of the dangers of unilaterally abandoning the One China 
policy.99 
The Heritage Foundation declared the Trump-Xi 100-day action plan for greater economic 
cooperation a success after the Mar-a-Lago meeting. Riley Walters, a Heritage research 
associate noted that several notable outcomes occurred, including a commitment to allow 
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beef exports to China.100 Although Asia Society and Heritage Foundation follow a harder line 
on China, they support deeper Sino-US economic ties.101 
Yet, US think tanks, including those embedded in China, remain firm in urging President 
Trump to leverage US economic power, remain militarily strong in East Asia, and consolidate 
the ‘rules-based order’. Hence, Paul Haenle, president of the Carnegie-Tsing hua Center, 
simultaneously declared President Trump's 2017 China visit a great success - a $2500 million 
deals on trade and investment,102 and called for policies to stand up to China’s increasingly 
assertive foreign policy stance.103 
  
Key questions remain but state-elite-networked linkages are clear, durable, and require 
deeper research. A great deal has been achieved by these US and Chinese state-endorsed 
programmes especially in the economics field and arguably in the field of social stability-
management. Elite socialisation that incorporates Chinese elites into US agendas, or vice 
versa, is possibly fostering the way to a new type of great power relationship. This is 
challenged by the Trump administration for immediate political purposes and to contain 
China’s power, but the networks central to building this long-term relationship are deeply 
embedded, well organised and generously funded. Their resilience may be tested so their 
activities in the current period require close attention for empirical understanding as well as 
theoretical implications, especially in relation to the power of an unorthodox administration 
to effect deep change.    
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President Trump and Elite Knowledge Networks: Hegemonic threat or recalibration? 
If networks are able to ward off or manage threats to established order, the Trump 
administration offers an interesting test. Of course conclusions must be provisional but there 
are already some significant indicators sufficient for a preliminary analysis. 
 
As a populist outsider, opponent of both main parties’ leadership groups, numerous 
experienced officials refused to serve in the Trump administration.104 In addition, America’s 
allies – embedded in US-led elite networks formed additional pressure points.105 They are 
becoming more self-reliant and strengthening their cooperation with one another.106 While 
maintaining a strong America First line, Trump would find it difficult to buck such powerful 
forces, suggesting a strategy of disruption where possible especially via executive actions, 
symbolic actions to assuage his mass base, and where the GOP backed key positions, such as 
opposition to climate change, and UNESCO. Yet, Trump’s principal difference with his 
predecessors in practice is his emphasis on the strong sovereign state underpinning the US-
led international system. Trump foreign policy adviser, Heritage’s James Jay Carafano, notes 
that Trump is no isolationist but one who believes, in contrast to Obama for instance, that 
“The international superstructure has to stand on a firm foundation…” of sovereign states. 
Trump’s nationalism, therefore, should be seen in that light. Trump’s “perception” is that a 
powerful (US) sovereign state “enabled post-World War America and the rest of the free 
world to rise above the chaos of a half century of global depression and open war.”107 Trump 
is therefore rhetorically disruptive but not a system-breaker, exploiting US’ powers to loosen 
international constraints, forcing allied uncertainties over his unpredictability to lead to 
greater self-reliance and, thereby weakening each in a concerted strategy of transactional 
bilateralism. This is, in essence, not dissimilar a goal to previous US presidents, minus the 
specific style of President Trump. However, the consequences this time may be more severe 
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for US power as domestic political polarisation increases and China exploits uncertainties to 
expand its own spheres of influence and re-ordering practices, such as via OBOR.108 So 
interdependent are the US and China, however, that movement is towards systemic 
recalibration rather than fundamental change, as recommendations for US “congagement” 
with China suggest.109 Both the Asia Society’s report and leaked State department diplomatic 
cables recognise the ebbs and flows of the Sino-US relationship, within the broader strategy 
of “shaping China’s choices” and a view of ‘rising’ China as unlikely to cause “violence and 
instability”. A confrontational approach, according to the Asia Society report, was the 
rational strategy for the Trump administration much as it had begun to be for the Obama 
administration.110  Nevertheless, the current period is testing the resilience of LIO elite 
networks, a challenge that has galvanised their core networks and developed new 
organisations.111 
 
Overall, eighty-six bipartisan former national security officials declared Trump unfit for 
office due to his alleged lack of knowledge and understanding of America’s global 
responsibilities, with several declining to serve in the Trump administration.112 
 
Analysis of the 86 signatories’ think tank affiliations (central to elite knowledge networks), 
and comparison with Trump-associated think tanks, shows that the Heritage Foundation, 
which is closest to Trump circles,113 is almost absent (just one linkage to the 86 signatories). 
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Conversely, a think tank under-represented in Trump circles – the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR) – is the best represented overall among signatories – at 29 linkages (16 of 36 
bipartisan and 13 of 50 conservatives).114 Meanwhile, Heritage remained quietly opposed to 
Trump’s criticisms of the US-led order and openly critical of his apparent warmth towards 
Russia.115 Heritage remains wedded to a global military footprint, nuanced approaches to 
international organisations like the UN, but firm support for NATO, South Korea and Japan, 
consistent with its conservative-nationalist internationalism.116 Heritage prepared several 
policy documents for candidate Trump who appointed Heritage founding-president, Ed 
Feulner, to his transition team. Jim DeMint, the-then HF President, a prominent US senator 
and Tea Party conservative,117 brought Heritage closer to Trump, along with several other 
Foundation people -  Becky Norton Dunlop, former Reagan attorney general Ed Meese, and 
Carafano (who advised Trump and headed his national security and homeland security 
transition teams). Rebekah Mercer, a Heritage board member and major Trump donor, 
worked on the transition team’s executive committee. In addition, Vice President Mike Pence 
has long associations with Heritage, including at its state level policy councils, and is a bridge 
from the Republican party’s conservatives to the populist elements of the Trump 
administration.118  
 
Hence, despite his unorthodox advisers, the Trump administration is embedded within strong 
relationships generally supportive of US world leadership, sharing his critique of the liberal 
“establishment”. Heritage, for example, recommended Trump discuss a US-UK free trade 
agreement, strengthen the ‘special relationship’, support increased national sovereignties in 
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Europe, robustly back NATO and prevent an EU military identity.119 Heritage briefing papers 
focused on reforming NAFTA within the overall remit of fair, free trade, as opposed to 
outright protectionism.120 The appointment of Robert Lighthizer as US trade representative – 
under Reagan he placed tariffs on Japanese steel imports – suggests significant continuities 
rather than a break with tradition. The US will act forcefully and attempt to contain and 
subordinate competitors.121 Finally, Trump’s complaints about China’s trade violations echo 
those of President Obama who referred fourteen cases to the WTO.122 The steel and 
aluminium tariffs announced in March 2018 were largely symbolic, according to the Heritage 
Foundation, and exempted Canada, Mexico and Australia. But they were followed up by 
larger US, and retaliatory Chinese, tariffs. The impact of this tariff dispute remains to be seen 
but, as the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement indicates, the aim of 
transactional bilateralism is to negotiate a stronger US position, creating a more powerful 
platform within the agreement.123 
 
Additionally, Trump’s own early appointments- General Mattis and Rex Tillerson to 
secretaries of defense and state, respectively, General McMaster to national security adviser, 
and General Kelly as White House chief of staff, shored up support for a broadly open 
economy as well as American commitments to NATO, and Japan-South Korea.124 Mattis and 
Tillerson lobbied to reverse President Trump’s publicly stated positions on executive order 
13769 temporarily halting Muslim migrants from seven states, especially Iraq,125 and on 
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statements about the seizure of Iraqi oil and the reintroduction of torture.126 McMaster filled 
NSC positions with traditional Republican appointees, recalled the joint chiefs of staff and 
director of national intelligence to full membership, removing the white supremacist Stephen 
Bannon.127 Reports of “adults in the room” scenario in the White House designed to constrain 
or block Trump’s more impulsive instincts are supported by Bob Woodward’s investigation, 
among other sources.128 
 
The sheer weight of senior appointees from the world of international finance – especially 
Goldman Sachs (Mnuchin as treasury secretary, for example) – from energy corporations 
(Tillerson, Ross at Commerce, plus several advisers such as National Economic Council head 
Gary Cohn – of Goldman Sachs - and Jamie Dimon – JP Morgan Chase129 - suggests that the 
likely policy effects will recalibrate international relationships rather than overturn the post-
1945 order.130 
 
The CFR contributed to increasing pressure on the Trump administration to stay within 
bounds. CFR president, Richard Haass, published A World in Disarray: American Foreign 
Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order, advising President Trump to court China to assist 
with North Korea’s nuclear weapons programmes,131 to retain the Iran nuclear agreement, 
strengthen NATO, and retain the One-China policy.132 The first 2017 issue of Foreign Affairs 
was entitled Out of Order? The Future of the International System. In it, Kori Schake, an 
open letter signatory and former Bush-era NSC and state department member, critiqued the 
Trump administration’s apparent exacerbation of Obama era American retrenchment as 
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“false logic”.133 And a CFR special report recommended that President Trump strengthen 
NATO while reassuring Russia of its defensive character.134 Ikenberry’s Foreign Affairs 
article, part of a section designated “Present at the Destruction?” called for a major 
mobilisation against Trumpism by liberal-order supporters across the US and liberal world. 
The Atlantic Council, for example, and the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing 
Democracy, are actively attempting to shape, constrain and direct the Trump administration. 
The latter’s leadership group overlaps with open letter signatories, discussed earlier, and 
previous administrations– for example, Michael Chertoff (secretary of homeland security, 
2005-09), David Kramer (Bush state department), Michael McFaul (Obama administration 
NSC and ambassador to Russia), and Kori Schake (CFR member, former Clinton-Bush NSC 
and DoD).135 
 
The CFR is heavily interlocked with other elite groupings, including the corporate media. 
Several board members of the Washington Post, for example, are CFR and Rand Corporation 
members.136 The Post, the New York Times, CNN and several other major news organisations 
are interconnected in numerous ways and appear to have played key roles in promoting the 
“Russia-Trump” collusion allegations137 and investigations which would appear to be part of 
a broader attempt to try to constrain the president’s more unorthodox tendencies in regard to 
the international order. This plays out in numerous ways – criticism on areas of disagreement 
and applause when President Trump behaves in more ‘acceptable’ ways – such as ordering 
cruise missile strikes on Syria in April 2017, among other actions. Fareed Zakaria (CNN), a 
CFR board director, declared Trump truly presidential in the wake of cruise missile attacks 
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on the Assad regime.138 CFR-media linkages are extensive – see a partial list of connections 
with a wide array of broadly liberal outlets, including ABC, NBC, CNN, National Journal, 
Washington Post, New York Times, The Atlantic, and many others.139 
 
Hence, while there is a clear rhetorically-destabilising party-political mass-oriented tendency 
to challenge the LIO, represented by the Trump phenomenon, it is also the case that the 
dominant forces within party leadership groupings are firmly embedded in the institutions 
that founded and consolidated that order. And Trump’s own recognition of America’s 
essentially global interests militates against a radical threat to the existing order, even as his 
rhetoric undermines allies’ confidence.    
 
President Trump’s refusal to condemn Russian intervention in the Ukraine and expressed 
admiration for President Vladimir Putin remains controversial and an area of clear division 
with the stated positions of Heritage and other think tanks. Three points should be made on 
this: first, his appointees – Tillerson, Mattis, McMaster and Nikki Haley as US ambassador to 
the UN, along with CIA director Mike Pompeo,140 and NSC Russia-Europe head, Fiona Hill 
of Brookings141 – have condemned Russia,  and the official sanctions policy remains in 
place.142 The US Senate, in a bipartisan vote, passed sanctions on Russia over alleged 
interference in the 2016 presidential elections.143 Secondly, this illustrates what might be a 
hallmark of this administration – rhetorical, racialized and Islamophobic flourishes that play 
to his political base against the establishment, while broadly maintaining a strategy abroad 
that has stayed mainly within the established status quo.144 This includes Trump’s tariff 
policy towards China.145 
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The Trump administration’s unorthodox approach, especially rhetorically, provides a key test 
of America’s role in east Asia, especially in regard to China’s emergence as a regional great 
power. China’s stability and rise to ‘responsible’ great power has long been an American 
vital interest, even as political rhetoric has been fevered at times. US ambassador Clark 
Randt’s thirty year retrospective and prospective assessment in 2009 serves as an important 
official indicator of the long-term competitive-cooperative character of Sino-US relations.146 
Trump maintained a highly critical line against China’s currency manipulation, impact on 
jobs etc… and then, as president-elect apparently challenged established One-China policy. 
Nevertheless, as president, Trump has chosen to stick with the status quo on that question.147 
In so doing, Trump follows a well-trod path, echoed in a recent Heritage article.148 
 
Terry Branstad, former Iowa governor and Trump’s choice for U.S. Ambassador to Beijing, 
is long-associated with Xi, and familiar with the China market for agricultural commodities, 
and a supporter of the TPP. This suggested that Trump values the Sino-US relationship in 
practice.149 Echoing Xi, Branstad noted the US aims at “win-win” outcomes on trade and 
other matters, and to create a better international environment, even if Branstad shares the 
Trump administartion’s settled view that China needs to open its markets and engage in 
structural reform.150 
  
President Trump’s nominee to the East Asian and Pacific Affairs bureau, currently holding 
the position on a temporary basis is seen by Da Wei, a Beijing-based expert on China-US 
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relations, as favourable to strengthening Sino-US cooperation.151 As indicated earlier, 
Matthew Pottinger, Trump’s special assistant and senior director for Asia at the NSC, led the 
US delegation to attend the two-day May 2017 OBOR summit in Beijing. Pottinger’s 
presence at the Beijing conference signaled that Washington recognized OBOR’s importance 
as a trans-regional economic initiative.152At the summit, Pottinger announced the American 
Belt and Road Working Group to bring American companies into the OBOR process.153 
Despite the ebbs and flows of President Trump’s rhetoric, it appears he wishes, like previous 
administrations, to manage the relationship with care, his transactionalist instincts 
notwithstanding. 
 
President Trump has retreated from several of his positions about the US-centred post-1945 
international treaty system. Trump’s ‘radical’ agenda has, up to now, been reined in by a 
combination of established elite networks centred on his own appointments154 as well as by 
the closeness of his administration to the conservative movement155 in general and the 
Heritage Foundation, a think tank wedded to a nationalistic approach to US power in the 
world but certainly not ‘isolationism’.  In addition, the positions taken in bipartisan open 
letters signed by prominent former national security officials and think tankers chime with 
leading members of both parties in the US senate, further reining in Trump’s room for 
manoeuvre. These are backed up or connected with significant levels of media scrutiny, 
including after the death of US Senator John McCain.156 
 
Yet, the positions of people close to President Trump, especially Stephen Bannon, a right-
wing Christian identity populist (for some a white supremacist), and Stephen Miller, a hard 
right winger on immigration who authored the Muslim travel ban and writes Trump’s most 
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significant speeches, are unique in post-1945 American experience.157 Additionally, the 
‘purging’ of numerous lower- and mid-tier state department officials, and failure to appoint 
his own choices below secretary rank, could disrupt or challenge policy implementation, 
fitting the Bannon agenda of “deconstructing the administrative state”.158 It would take a 
major departure to indicate a serious shift in America’s global role, however, such as 
effective withdrawal from an organisation such as NATO, or from Japan-South Korean 
security guarantees, including a failure to effectively provide leadership in a “crisis”. Action 
short of this may undermine but will unlikely deeply in the long run affect the LIO. It may 
loosen the bonds of international order, however, permit America greater freedom to more 
selectively engage and work through some regional allies of action. 
  
CONCLUSION 
Ideational networks play significant roles in building and protecting US hegemony yet remain 
neglected in hegemony studies which tend to remain state-centric and define material power 
in narrow terms. The evidence above suggests a new research agenda combining elite 
knowledge networks with ‘material’ factors of power including state agencies, but also 
redefines ‘material’ power to include tangible, enduring and influential elite networks. Those 
networks deliver outcomes in the real world over time. Examining how such hegemonic 
power works directly connects state with private forces; domestic with international, and US 
elites with elites of core and emerging powers. The management of the “rise” of China and of 
Chinese economic reform, at China’s leaders’ invitation, indicates neglected aspects of the 
Sino-US relationship but which has implications for future relations and, specifically, for the 
claims of the Trump administration about China’s behaviour. The case of China and of the 
Trilateral Commission’s approach to NIEO demands represent a critique of liberal 
socialization-into-the-system claims – the evidence suggests processes of elite incorporation 
or domestication into freer markets and growth-led development, and its attendant 
inequalities. Yet, more coercive methods, backed by elite networks, such as Trump’s trade 
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tariffs policy towards China, remain a key means of containing or subordinating ‘rising’ 
powers that threaten US’ hegemonic positions.159 
 
Deeper and broader research of the roles of elite knowledge networks may provide greater 
understanding of the ideational-intellectual sinews and structures of American power which 
may yet prove the most significant in perpetuating its hegemonic position in the world 
system, or limiting damage to it.  
 
Trump appointees have argued that there is a “deep state” of intelligence agencies and others 
leaking information to undermine the administration.160 Elite network analysis may help 
explain the role of broadly liberal elites in managing domestic threats to order.161 Trump’s 
supporters’ claims open the question of the character of the American state, its unelected 
elements’ roles, and shifts discussion to tensions between elitist concentrations of power both 
within the state and in its relations with influential private elite organisations. The Trump 
administration has political reasons to make such claims, especially given its linkages with 
Wall Street and attempts to shore up its popular political base. Nevertheless, hierarchy, 
elitism and attempts at engineering consent around dominant paradigms rather than 
democracy appear to be the more significant factors in explaining how the politics of 
hegemonic order works at home and abroad. Indications are that President Trump’s 
authorization of US military attacks on Syria in April 2017, and the stationing of a permanent 
military force there, may signal partial domestication of his ‘radical’ America First agenda.162 
 
The power of elite knowledge networks is, at least up to time of writing, sufficient to prevent 
radical alterations to the international treaty system that underpins the US-led LIO. 
Conversely, since elite networks do not always achieve their goals, or do so only by storing 
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up problems for the future, it is important to take seriously the radical campaign rhetoric that 
propelled Donald Trump to the White House. Just as the NIEO re-emerged in other forms 
decades later to challenge Western power, the calls for restraint in the deployment of 
American power – from the Left and Right during the 2016 presidential elections - and 
critiques of its security alliances, may well reappear in future election cycles. It should be 
borne in mind that there is enduring scepticism in American public opinion about military 
intervention and unilateralism but strong support for positive engagement and international 
cooperation, including via the United Nations. A research agenda based on elite knowledge 
networks might yet prove capable of explaining the current, seemingly turbulent phase in the 
politics of US hegemonic order.      
 
 
 
 
